

8 Feb (5)

(Chau)

- Did VC lodge in Hué just to provoke destruction by US?
- " flag-raising by US?

- Chau: after election, shift toward safety and (extreme) to active support of VC; thus, VC could not have carried out attacks before now, have more help in cities. [US attacks will create more VC in cities — at of old/new refugees, students...]
- Hué: close to Center + North (not South): Empires' rule over those. And NVN leaders from Center.
- They, campaign for PM.

Chau to Fulbright: When US close to topple Diem (instead of pulling out, before or after fall) it took on great responsibility for later development. US made that the leaders it has chosen for VN do not draw the loyalty of the VN people.

"Morale is lower now than at any time — been lower than 64-65. (cities safe then).

- ARVN may lose 20%. [More? DE?] My soldiers must care for families.

- Insecurity: Before, people in cities were safe; now, not. VC didn't do it earlier because could not.

- VC ^{had} ~~had~~ (without control over it) Grand Uprising: if succeeded, Total Victory (VC were denied that!; was so, great success).

(Also: having used

- Opportunity: VNers bourgeoisie very lazy — but when pressed, as now, they will have to choose: for their self-interest. They will have control; may not deal with VC; but may could be attracted by GVN — lead by religious leaders, + leaders like Dan, Huong. (Dan organized Hanoi to avoid starvation in 1945).

This should call on Huay, Sun, Dan to help the people (then they have no choice) — instead of Thang!

Recovery Administration — like private org.

(Like like flood:

Help another

- Get people into orgs; Peoples Self-Protection

Why VC push now?

VC enter Phase III when they are (a) very weak politically, or (b) militarily, or both.

VC tactic: announce 7-day truce; but press Khe Sanh; lead US to press RVN to shorten truce, end it in North, start it again; so VC break truce, blamed it on US.

- RD Cadre + soldiers will leave field to stay on their families.

Pacification is finished — morale low, self-confidence zone: need to protect cities.

Chau, too, is surprised that VC tried this (time not ripe) and that it was so successful.

(Need bigger forces: to stay longer in Saigon and Hué, while harassing other cities: could get people with them — e.g. 500,000 massing — as when de Gaulle entered Paris)

Questions asked:

What is VC penetration of : RVN
cities
ARVN
sects
students, labor, etc.

If Thieu, Ky, Americans, Legislator, work together in
having (NA not necessary following GVN line) — VC in
trouble.

After

Did VC ignore the clauses for a second attempt or
not worse than?

So their support & org in cities less or more than
before — after VC losses? What new recruiting?

Election: with Roent, Thieu 1-1.2 million. Extra .4 million
forced. 8 people who feel safe with ^{voting for} military

800,000 who voted for Duyen — desperate, want to end war
on any terms (maybe $\frac{1}{3}$ VC; yet Duyen got high proportion
in Chau Doc, An Giang, ... Ca Mau ...).

Suu/Huynh/Ky voters: true nationalists.

Since election: both Thieu and VC have grown in strength:
8 people wiped up with Thieu; but many Huynh/Suu
people shift toward VC. Threaten incursion to VC.

Talks:

8 7 

Pacification - 3 letters from Tues.

Political Developpt / mon.

Improving ARVN 2 mon.

and Inform 2

CG 2

Elections?

Impact of VC campaign

US strategy

US-GVN relations

Political power structure

Get bio

Research Inst.?

US Strategy

- Have plan for discussion : consider, Why not successful so far?
- Improve ARVN
- ~~Redeploy~~ Redeploy ARVN/US/allied forces:
 - e.g. - protect populated areas : organize PSP
 - harass VC in populated. keep them away from pop.

(Dynamics: Roberts)

Refugees out of Saigon; back to countryside + VC.

Demonstration of officials/affiliates : if USA to this can lead to
GVN behavior pushing people to VC.

Ky/Thieu more easily influenced by US, after attacks.

People who had come from countryside that made mistakes;
Not so much, respect US, but:
now, go back, or work for VC in cities. All lose all
confidence US can protect them ; will mobilize them, agitate
them, polarize them in action camps : for GVN, for VC. If GVN
neglects (or treats them unfairly...).

- 1) Basic reason for failure so far:
 - 1) lack of participation by VN govt.
(evidence: difficulty getting recruits for mil.; desertion.)
 - 2) lack of effort of administrators at all levels in reforming admin.
- 3) lack of leadership in admin., mil., political domain.
- 4) Corruption, internal disputes.

- 2) Because of this, Allied forces became dominant.
- 3) However, people come to feel as very auxiliary to US effort.
- 4) War fought militarily: S+D, bombing, saturating,
neglect of building up positive support — even in controlled area.
(May VN govt in contiguous know better, but don't try hard to convince US and ARVN — think their role is secondary).

New objective: active partic. by VN govt in the gov.

- 1) - Much more representative gov. (Not existing K-T govt).

- Unified gov (give by definite duties)

- Enlarge gov

✓ - Separation & responsible legislature

✓ - Stronger justice system

✓ - Free but responsible press (law on status of press)

(1) necessary to (2)

- 2) Pacify the pacified area. (using regular

1) Improve living conditions — toward in particular, improve

process of justice, police harassment, VC security
(more important than physical standards).

b) Organize people for self-protection.

c) Redeploy security forces

Stop USMC "pac" (not effective); [get out of the South...]

[Use RD Cadre to reinforce village and build admin;
area in "secure" area.

3) Later deployment:

Cadres/policemen in "secure" area

PF/RK encircling this.

ARVN ~~of DSD~~ prevent VC strong units from
attacking PF/RK or population. (organized as ~~bns~~ ^{full strength}.)

US/Allied: protect bases; harassing enemy bases;
reinforce/reaction forces.

(not pursuing local guerrillas — kill too many non-VC.
e.g. in Delta, US to reinforce.

Bn → Paar → tactical mobile brigade

(no more div or corps; but logistical support command.
area commands for support.)

In 3 years with this strategy, VC accept minority role.

) "Can VC intercept?" Ans: We bomb VC villages, but don't disrupt
this org.

4) All civil factions — dual, local, urban, ethnic — done with aim of stability + supporting people's organizations + People's Self-Protection.

More stable than at any time in past.

(Hyp.)
(a) May will go over to ~~the~~ VC in any case;
(b) Rest will go to VC or GVN, depending on GVN/US (or VC) actions.

But: will

("all VNees will know they would not have put Ky/Koc/Bkg in charge of Recovery without US pressure — again, US supporting Northerners.")

Discontent with GVN enables VC to expand their org. rapidly in cities: send in weapons, agents, observers; and to organize helpers.

(a) How much support ^{in cities} did VC need to carry out attack?
(b) If ~~Chau~~ type: lots (Chau type), when did it appear? Why? How severe?

Chau: Since elections; nature of gov; with broadening; possible to reverse.

[All our statistics of "progress" reflect what the VC have done lately; not a good predictor of VC action in next 6 months

Other aspect of VC attacks:

- 1) going to VC as result of fear of VC
- 2) more vulnerable to VC influence, more security for VC (since people will be less willing to inform on VC, refuse cooperation — knowing VC can retaliate). i.e. easier

Since VC penetration of GVN much greater than GVN penetration of VC, grassroots contact — so it is much safier to coop with VC than gov. (VP in French 2nd Bureau — to kill priests, like

— What should our advisory power be in VN?

[Battalion liaison — not advisors; ...]

much more professional — better paid — police advisors.

county; but kept very close contact with VN; had VN working for them at all levels

i.e. not being concerned with maintaining "independent sovereignty" of VN — with effect of closely advised from WNE, more intimate contact

Ford: Never called anyone "adviser"; in 1952, order for VN units

Now, ^{need} officials at all levels, less unpredictable; in fact, less motivation, because of improper US interference. ↗

(See us. integration: a) need, in this war, for VN motivation participation, while Korea; b) resistance of VN, politicized by years.

If US takes over now, integrates ARVN; VC will fight harder, thinking they are on right track; US could win this way, if it could ~~but~~ fight despite US public, world opinion.

Dick Fortin

Chair: Khe Sanh as diversion to keep US up north

A month ago, expected several provincial capitals to be overrun within a month — because VC was concentrating the contested areas — penetrating, moving...

Why? Because ARVN was concentrating on RD areas — and US was off in bases, borders [no one in middle areas, contiguous to pop.] (+ RD areas not major pop., anyway)



US choice: 1) hitting bases; hasn't worked,
2) only protect US bases — VC takes over rural (3) both bases and surrounding rural — build up SVN base.

" French were in VN for 100 years — yet they always felt necessary to maintain a respectable VN facade of leadership — to maintain access to VN pop (with small number of troops). They had colonial intent — yet maintained reserve. They had a deep professional understanding of country; but kept very close contact with VN; had VN working for them at all levels

i.e. not being concerned with maintaining "independent sovereignty" of VN — with effect of closely advised from VN, non-intrusive contact

Ford: Never called anyone "adviser"; in 1952, order for VN units

Now, officials at all levels, less respectable; in fact, less motivation, because of improper US interference. ^{need} I

(Same w.r. integration: a) need, in this war, for VN motivation participation, like Korea; b) resistance of VN, prolonged by years.

If US takes over war, integrates ARVN; VC will fight harder, thinking they are on right track; US could win the war, if it could keep fighting despite US public, world opinion.

Dick Fortin

With 2 million troops in South, US wins, with or without integration. (to invade, / will now). 

But why integrate, to improve ARVN?

- a) Housing for dependents: e.g. junior offs, NCO's.
- b) Clean-up promotion system, with fast effects
- c) Death/injury benefits for dependents
- d) Reduce migraines between senior/junior ranks.

(though too complicated)

On HES: idea of "court security"; ~~so~~ control: not index of "penetration" — i.e. org/commit of people, ability to maintain security in absence of troops (e.g. if troops were removed, to work elsewhere).

Claim: Kle found as dimension to keep US up north

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US claim: 1) little bases; hasn't worked.
2) only protect US bases — VC takes over rural (3) both bases and surrounding rural — build up RVN base.

In 3 years, VC accepts minor role.

Now, Ho may want US to increase troops — in North, bases — but not invade. Thus, threaten K.S., don't attack. Get a new President; go into negoti in strength.

[By (a) concentrating on K.S., and (b) "attrition" strategy, and (c) sending more troops: US may play into Ho's hands as neatly as the French played into the German hands in WWI, Schlieffen Plan, "swinging door."

[Use attack to evaluate HES (and intell, warning systems: comparing. e.g. CG). What was rating for... Ben Tre...]

